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ABSTRACT
This article focuses on Fascist Italy's active air defenses during the Second
World War. It analyzes a number of crucial factors: mass production of anti-
aircraft  weapons  and  fighters;  detection  of  enemy aircraft  by  deploying
radar;  coordination  between  the  Air  Ministry  and  the  other  ministries
involved, as well as between the Air Force and the other armed services. The
relationship  between  the  government  and  industrialists,  as  well  as  that
between the regime and its German ally, are also crucial elements of the
story.  The  article  argues  that  the  history of  Italian  air  defenses  reflected
many of the failures of the Fascist regime itself. Mussolini's strategy forced
Italy to assume military responsibilities and economic commitments which it
could not hope to meet. Moreover, industrial self-interest and inter-service
rivalry combined to inhibit even more the efforts of the regime to protect its
population, maintain adequate armaments output, and compete in technical
terms with the Allies.
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Introduction
The political and ideological role of Italian air power worked as a metaphor
for  the  regime  as  a  whole,  as  recent  historiography  has  shown.  The
champions of aviation, including fighter pilots who pursued and shot down
enemy planes, represented the anthropological revolution at the heart of the
totalitarian  experiment.1 As  the  Fascist  regime  had  practiced  terrorist
bombing on the civilian populations of Ethiopian and Spanish towns and
villages  before  the  Second  World  War,  the  Italian  political  and  military
leadership, press, and industrialists were all aware of the potential role of air
1. Eric  Lehmann,  "Il  fallimento  dell'aeronautica  italiana,"  in  Nicola  Labanca,  ed.,  I
bombardamenti  aerei  sull'Italia.  Politica,  Stato  e  società  (1939–1945) (Bologna:  Il
Mulino, 2012), pp. 161-67.
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forces—both  bombers  and  air  defenses—in  deciding  any future  conflict.
Well  into the  Second World  War,  propaganda posters  depicted powerful
anti-aircraft  batteries  hitting  enemy  planes  and  targeting  others  with
searchlights.  Newspapers  described  the  first  enemy  raids  in  Italy  using
apocalyptic images of aerial combat.2 However, reports from prefects and
political  police  informers  throughout  the  country  showed  that  the
population's views on Italy's air defenses were generally negative from as
early as the summer of 1940, when the first Royal Air Force (RAF) raids on
Italian industrial cities and ports made it evident that enemy aircraft were
able to bomb unopposed. After the first raid on Turin during the night of 11-
12  June  1940,  the  ineffectiveness  of  the  air  defenses  around  the  Fiat
factories became evident to the workforce, who, as a result, "began to doubt
the regime's propagandistic optimism."3 The reality was visible to the naked
eye, despite reports to the contrary published in Italian newspapers.4 During
the war, Italian air defenses were frequently mentioned in jokes, rumors, and
even  prayers.  Air  defenses  were  generally  described  as  non-existent  or
useless, when they were not regarded as a danger to the population.5
This mistrust was well placed. Italy, especially at the outset of the war,
relied  on  extremely  primitive  defenses.  Instead  of  using  radar  to  detect
enemy aircraft, a system of "aerophones"—acoustic listening devices—was
put in place, often operated by blind people who were considered to have
better hearing. Aerophones were linked to information-gathering centers, in
turn connected to the Anti-aircraft Territorial Defense Command (DiCaT)
which issued orders to fire.6 Anti-aircraft batteries were equally antiquated,
most  dating  from the  First  World  War;  before  1940,  no  funds had  been
found to update either the means of detection or the available weaponry.7
The Ministry of Popular Culture (the Italian propaganda office) did not
seem to have fully realized the extent of the malfunctioning of the defense
system even as  late  as  1942.  That  year,  film director  Roberto  Rossellini
produced at Cinecittà his film Un pilota ritorna. The heroic account of an
2. Marco Fincardi, "Anglo-American Air Attacks and the Rebirth of Public Opinion in
Fascist Italy," in Claudia Baldoli,  Andrew Knapp, and Richard Overy, eds.,  Bombing,
States and Peoples in Western Europe 1940–1945 (London: Continuum, 2011), p. 242.
3. Valerio Castronovo,  Fiat  1899–1999.  Un secolo  di  storia italiana (Milan:  Rizzoli,
1999), p. 586.
4. Nicola Labanca, "L'esercito e la contraerea," in Labanca, ed., I bombardamenti aerei,
p. 134; Luigi Petrella,  Staging the Fascist War: The Ministry of Popular Culture and
Italian Propaganda on the Home Front, 1938–1943 (Bern: Peter Lang, 2016), pp. 59-65.
5. Claudia Baldoli and Andrew Knapp, Forgotten Blitzes: France and Italy under Allied
Air  Attack,  1940–1945 (London:  Continuum,  2012),  p.  202;  Baldoli,  "Religion  and
Bombing  in  Italy,  1940–1945,"  in  Baldoli,  Knapp,  and  Overy,  Bombing,  States  and
Peoples, pp. 140-41.
6. The  role  of  the  DiCaT  was,  as  explained  in  a  decree of  1935,  to  predispose  in
peacetime, and to operate in wartime, the defense of the country from enemy air or naval
attacks (Decree 181, 21 January 1935, Gazzetta Ufficiale, 16 March 1935).
7. Baldoli and Knapp, Forgotten Blitzes, p. 86.
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Italian  pilot  who  returned  from  the  Greek  campaign,  the  film  presents
images  of  an  outdated  aerophone  system for  detecting  planes,  and  anti-
aircraft guns only capable of firing at low altitudes as if they were up-to-date
equipment.8 Instead,  the DiCaT chiefly used for  active defense  the  1916
76mm anti-aircraft gun and the French Saint-Étienne M1907 machine guns
from the First World  War,  mounted on special gun carriages in order to
elevate their fire. The Difesa Contraerea (Dca – Air Defenses) established at
the time of the First World War had provided a general summary of the
situation  as  early  as  1935,  denouncing  the  lack  of  modern  artillery,
munitions, and qualified personnel. By 1937, not one of all the ninety-four
Italian provinces had any funds for air defenses, and only 218 batteries out
of a total of 930 were actually functioning, and the new 20mm machine guns
were not yet available. In 1938, General Antonio Gandin, an Italian Army
Chief of Staff and close collaborator of Marshal Pietro Badoglio, defined the
air defenses as "absolutely insufficient"—a situation that had improved little
by the time European war broke out in 1939.9
Another  unresolved  question  concerned  the  state  of  air  raid  alarms.
During the war, many alarms turned out to be false because the system for
detecting  enemy  aircraft  was  imprecise.  On  other  occasions,  however,
alarms only sounded when the bombs were already falling, resulting in high
casualties and badly damaging morale. Outside the city areas, church bells
often replaced sirens because the alarm system was not audible everywhere.
As late as 1943, after the fall of Mussolini, bells were used as a contingency
in case the system failed even in the cities.10 Moreover, as this article will
show, for the Italians, there was too little German assistance in developing
an effective air defense system, and what there was often arrived too late. At
the same time, Italian industry was unable, with a few (and late) exceptions,
to provide the armed forces with fighters and anti-aircraft weapons adequate
for modern air warfare.
Although Italy's air power theorist Giulio Douhet had warned since 1921
about the frightful impact of air offensive in the next conflict, expectations
about  a  future  air  war  proved to  be  an  inaccurate  forecast  of  the  actual
conflict.11 The regime could not have anticipated the vast tonnages dropped
by the Allies in 1942-43. In addition to active defenses, a system of look-
outs  had  to  be  organized,  blackout  provisions  arranged,  and  an  audible
network of sirens installed. Shelters had to be built; gas masks supplied; the
evacuation  of  (at  least)  children,  the  infirm,  and  the  elderly  planned.
8. Un  pilota  ritorna, directed  by  Roberto  Rossellini,  starring  Massimo  Girotti  and
Michela Belmonte, Italy: Alleanza Cinematografica Italiana, 1942.
9. Paolo Formiconi, "La protezione e la difesa contraerea del regime fascista: evoluzione
istituzionale," in Labanca, I bombardamenti aerei, pp. 117, 122-24.
10. See,  for  example,  Report  of the Comando XV Corpo d'Armata,  31 August  1943,
Prefettura, b. 155, Archivio di Stato di Genova, Italy.
11. Giulio  Douhet,  The  Command  of  the  Air (Washington,  DC:  Office  of  Air  Force
History, 1983; first Italian edition, 1921), pp. 189-90.
Global War Studies  15 (1)  2018  │  7
Delivered by Ingenta to IP: 128.240.225.18 on: Thu, 12 Mar 2020 12:32:39
Copyright (c) Global War Studies. All rights reserved.
Emergency services had to be greatly expanded with the introduction of air
raid wardens, rescue and clearance teams, and anti-contamination squads.
Little money was forthcoming for these tasks, and the chiefs of staff of all
three armed forces were doubtful in June 1940 about Italy's capacity to enter
the European conflict with such a poor level of preparation for protecting the
Italian population.12
The success of the regime's organization of active air defenses depended
on a number of crucial factors: mass production of competitive anti-aircraft
weapons  and  day  and  night  fighters  (which  involved  the  availability  of
funds, raw materials, and machinery); a system for the detection of enemy
aircraft  by  deploying  radar  in  areas  that  were  most  in  danger  of  being
bombed; and coordination between the Air Ministry and the other ministries
involved, as well as between the Air Force and the other armed services. The
relationship  between  the  government  and  industrialists,  as  well  as  that
between the regime and its German ally, are also crucial elements of the
story. While passive defenses have been explored in previous studies,13 this
article will focus on Italy's active air defenses after briefly contextualizing
them within the wider institutional air protection system.
Preparing for War: The Organization of Active and Passive Defenses
A series of laws on Italy's preparation for war were drafted throughout the
1920s and 1930s that sought to tackle all the potential problems air attack
might cause: the organization of civil mobilization, rules on the construction
of  shelters,  the  protection  of  industrial  sites,  and  the  creation  and
coordination of institutions devoted to the country's defense. Most of these
concerned civil defense. Under a law drawn up by the Air Ministry in 1939,
the  protection  of  industrial  sites,  whether  privately  or  publicly  owned,
became compulsory; all  the parties  concerned were required to prepare a
passive  defense  plan  within  three  months  of  the  law's  passage,  and  to
implement the plan within three years of its approval—that is, by 1943. The
War Ministry was charged with ensuring implementation.14 There were four
categories of industrial buildings: essential sites producing directly for the
military,  whose  protection  was  to  be  wholly  covered  by  the  state;  two
intermediate  categories  in  which  costs  were  to  be  shared  between
government and owners; and other industrial and commercial buildings, the
protection  of  which  was  entirely  the  owners'  responsibility.15 A  crucial
coordinating  body for  passive defense  was  the  National  Union  for  Anti-
12. Nicola Della Volpe, Difesa del Territorio e protezione antiaerea, 1915–1943  (Rome:
Ufficio Storico dello Stato Maggiore dell'Esercito, 1986), pp. 38-39.
13. Baldoli and Knapp, Forgotten Blitzes, especially chapters 3 and 4.
14. "Schema  di  disegno  di  legge  che  detta  norme  per  la  A.A.  degli  stabilimenti
industriali," n.d. (summer 1939), Ministero dell'Aeronautica (hereinafter MA), AG, 1939,
b. 33, fasc. 24, vol. II, Archivio Centrale dello Stato (hereinafter ACS), Rome, Italy.
15. "Promemoria," Air ministry meeting,  n.d.  (June 1939);  Decree 1672,  5 September
1938, MA, AG, 1939, b. 33, fasc. 24, vol. I, ACS.
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Aircraft  Protection  (UNPA),  founded  in  August  1934.16 UNPA's  statute,
approved by law in May 1936, established its headquarters in Rome under
the  direction  of  the  War  Ministry.  Its  principal  task  was  disseminating
knowledge of  the dangers of air war throughout Italy. It was to  produce
propaganda,  prepare  the  individual  protection  of  the  population,  collect
donations, oversee the construction of shelters for private citizens, distribute
gas masks (and ensure that firms purchased them for their employees), and
organize volunteer groups to collaborate with the police, the Red Cross, and
the fire services.
However,  such  measures,  desirable  in  themselves,  were  vitiated  by
fragmented  competences  in  an  uncoordinated  administrative  system.  In
1931, the War Ministry was given responsibility for air raid alarm systems
and active air defenses—except for air bases, which were defended by the
Air Force, and ports protected by the Navy, each of which answered to its
own  ministry. In  1932,  passive  defense—previously  entrusted  to  the
Ministry  of  the  Interior—came  under  the  control  of  the  War  Ministry,
although prefects, who remained responsible to the Ministry of the Interior,
had  to  apply  its  directives.  All  this  created  overlapping  responsibilities,
confusion, and conflicts.17 These in turn provoked efforts at coordination.
The War Ministry was to be aided by the Central Interministerial Committee
for Anti-Aircraft Protection (CCIPAA), which brought together representa-
tives of every ministry, the Red Cross, the Committee for Civil Mobilization,
the military chemical branch, and the National Fascist Union of Engineers.18
Similar problems affected the organization of active defenses, where the
lack of  a  unified  command was debated throughout  the  war.  Every time
there  was  an  attempt  to  unite  the  two  networks  of  passive  and  active
defenses, both the political authorities and the armed forces expressed their
hostility to collaboration. Paradoxically, as Paolo Formiconi has observed,
Mussolini, in the name of "unity of action at war," headed practically every
ministry  involved.19 In  terms  of  active  air  defense,  the  Air  Force  with
responsibility for  fighter  aircraft,  the Army with its  anti-aircraft batteries,
and the Navy with its maritime bases all created overlapping and conflicting
intentions, organization, technical material, and tactical methods, which in
turn led to misunderstandings, delays, and wasted expense throughout the
conflict.20
Adequate funds were never made available for proper training in either
16. Decree 1539, 30 August 1934, MA, AG, 1939, b. 33, fasc. 24, vol. I, ACS.
17. Marco Gioannini and Giulio Massobrio,  Bombardate l'Italia. Storia della guerra di
distruzione aerea, 1940–1945 (Milan: Rizzoli, 2007), p. 64.
18. Alfredo Giannuzzi Savelli,  Conferenza di propaganda per la protezione antiaerea
del  territorio  nazionale  e  della  popolazione  civile.  Anno  1931-X (Rome:  Istituto
Poligrafico dello Stato, 1934), p. 10.
19. Formiconi, "La protezione e la difesa contraerea," p. 123.
20. Nino  Arena,  La  Regia  Aeronautica,  1939–1943,  Vol.  1,  1939–1940.  Dalla  non
belligeranza all'intervento (Rome: Stato Maggiore Aeronautica – Ufficio Storico, 1981),
p. 72.
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active  or  passive  anti-air  defenses.  UNPA  membership  remained  low  at
150,000 in 1937, against eleven million for its German counterpart—while a
single campaign in Britain in 1938 brought half a million recruits in just a
few  months.  More  money  only  came  through  in  1939  to  help  UNPA
organize days of mobilization and anti-aircraft exercises, though these never
succeeded in overcoming the skepticism of the Italian public.21 A February
1940 report  by the  Supreme  Commission  of  Defense  confirmed that  the
DiCaT lacked one-third of the necessary personnel, and that the Red Cross
and the fire brigades suffered similar shortages.22 The number of firefighters
was dramatically insufficient. Turin, Italy's most industrial city, had a mere
188 at  the beginning  of  1940;  they sustained  their  first  casualties  on  14
August 1940 near Alessandria in Piedmont when an unexploded bomb was
detonated.23 In Italy, the emergency services entered the war undermanned
and undertrained, especially in comparison with their British and German
counterparts.
Both  active and  passive  defenses  were  also  enveloped by government
propaganda that chose to present air power as an advanced technological
achievement of the regime. A major consequence of this was the absence of
any  critical  debate  on  the  roles  of  active  and  passive  defenses  against
bombing if war should come. There was little opportunity for the evaluation
of results, for any discussion between central and local administrations, or
for meaningful comparison with what was being implemented abroad.24
Italy's Air Defenses on the Road to War:
Anti-aircraft Weapons and Fighter Aircraft
By May 1940, the DiCaT had activated thirty-two "first-degree" localities
defended by anti-aircraft artillery and automatic weapons and 265 "second-
degree" localities with only antiquated automatic weapons.25 At the start of
Italy's European war,  in June 1940, Italian fighter  aircraft were equipped
with a maximum of two small caliber weapons (either the Breda 7.7mm or
Breda 12.7mm machine guns),  while  Britain had produced fighter planes
mounting eight 7.7mm machine guns.26 DiCaT commanders were aware of
the limited weight of fire from Italian fighter aircraft. At the end of 1938,
one anti-aircraft militia general made this deficiency clear in a memorandum
he sent to the Air Ministry. In particular, he suggested that the caliber of
onboard  armament  be  raised  to  37mm,  or,  if  that  was  not  possible  for
financial or technical reasons, at the very least to 20mm; any smaller caliber
21. Gioannini and Massobrio, Bombardate l'Italia, p. 80.
22. Ibid., p. 59.
23. Ibid., p. 83.
24. Giorgio  Rochat,  Italo  Balbo.  Lo  squadrista,  l'aviatore,  il  gerarca (Turin:  UTET,
2003), p. 137.
25. Arena, La Regia Aeronautica, 1939–1943, Vol. 1, p. 73.
26. Andrea Natalini,  I rapporti tra aeronautica italiana e tedesca durante la Seconda
Guerra Mondiale (Cosenza: Edizioni Lionello Giordano, 2004), p. 11.
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would have "a derisory effect."27 As Gregory Alegi has argued, inadequate
weaponry constituted a  serious limitation for  Italian fighters,  which were
equipped with only two 12.7mm guns for at least the first two years of the
conflict; two additional 7.7mm guns were only added on later models, by
which stage the German Bf109 fighters  attached to  the Italian Air  Force
carried five guns: two 13mm machine guns and three 20mm cannons. Alegi
has calculated that the lethality index of a Macchi C.202 (with two 12.7mm
and two 7.7mm guns) was 9.8, compared to a value of 38.6 for a British
Spitfire Vb (with two 20mm cannon and four 7.7mm machine guns), and
38.4 for a U.S. P-51D Mustang (with six 12.7mm machine guns).28
Before Italy entered the war, Italian air commanders were also aware of
the problems posed by poor armament equipment for fixed defenses. They
warned Mussolini and his Foreign Minister Galeazzo Ciano in May 1940 of
the "wretched weapons" employed by the anti-aircraft defenses.29 As Nicola
Labanca  has  suggested,  Italian  anti-aircraft  weapons  might  have  been
effective in a short war against one opponent with a weak air force; it could
not be compared with German heavy anti-aircraft artillery, which enjoyed a
wide technical margin over Italian equipment throughout the war. In a war
against the British and American air forces, particularly after the failure of
the Fascist campaign in North Africa, it became impossible to defend the
peninsula  effectively.  Even  German  anti-aircraft  defenses  could  interfere
with, but not prevent, the bombing of German cities,  while the Battle of
Britain was won in the skies by fighter aircraft, not by the fixed anti-aircraft
artillery.30
According to Andrea Natalini, the reason why the Regia Aeronautica did
not use more powerful armament was due to its conviction that the priority
for  air  fighting  was  maneuverability.  Italian  pilots  were  exposed  to
propaganda that emphasized aerial acrobatics and this in turn supported the
idea that they could achieve superiority over more heavily armed opponents
because  of  the  greater  mobility of  their  aircraft.  Although this  school  of
thought  proved  effective  during  the  Spanish  Civil  War  and  the  war  in
Ethiopia, conditions during the Second World War were very different and
adequate solutions were found only once it was too late. Besides the small
caliber  of  air  weaponry,  Italian  fighters  were  also  produced  with  open
cockpits, which significantly limited their activity operating over the North
Sea or the Russian front.31 The open cockpit,  together with the lack of a
27. Memoir of General and DiCaT commander Achille Gaspari Chinaglia, sent to the Air
Ministry on 2 December 1938, MA, 1938, b. 28, cl. 3, scl. V, cartella 5, ACS.
28. Gregory  Alegi,  "Qualità  del  materiale  bellico  e  dottrina  d'impiego  italiana  nella
Seconda guerra Mondiale: il caso della Regia Aeronautica," Storia contemporanea 18:6
(December 1987), p. 1201.
29. Galeazzo Ciano,  entry for 3 May 1940,  Diario 1937–1943 (Milan:  Rizzoli,  1998;
first ed. 1946), p. 425.
30. Labanca, "L'esercito e la contraerea," pp. 135, 139, 131.
31. Natalini, I rapporti tra aeronautica italiana e tedesca, p. 11.
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supercharged engine, also meant that fighters such as the Fiat CR.42, Fiat
G.50, and Macchi C.200 were not able to reach altitudes much higher than
4,500-5,000 meters (around 15,000 feet).32 In preparation for the air war, the
Air  Ministry chose  to  commission  G.50s  and  Meridionali  Ro.51s,  which
were supposed to attain 6,000 meters (around 19,000 feet).33 However, it
was made clear that there were no facilities to mass-produce either of these
or the MC.200.34 In the end, just over 2,000 of the three fighter types were
produced between 1937 and 1943, an average of fewer than 400 a year. By
contrast,  the  British  aircraft  industry  produced  38,000  fighter  aircraft
between 1939 and 1944.35
Industrial Production
The  regime's  autarchic  policies  and  Mussolini's  ideological  rejection  of
foreign investment had favored major Italian firms such as Fiat and Ansaldo
over  possible  openings  for  foreign  businesses.  Ugo  Cavallero,  formerly
president of Ansaldo, continued this trend when he replaced Badoglio as
Supreme Commander of the armed forces in December 1940. To ensure that
they retained  their  monopoly,  Italian  industrialists  continued  to  raise  the
threat of labor unrest in case production was limited or interrupted. As a
consequence, Fiat eventually produced 2,000 CR.42s (which replaced the
CR.32 of  the 1930s) between 1938 and 1944, a higher number than any
other Italian fighter, even though it proved to be obsolete by the standards of
other air forces.36
In an analysis of the relationship between industry and the armed forces in
the Second World War, Lucio Ceva argued that industrialists did not exhibit
a deep commitment to the Fascist war, with the result that the regime was
unable  to  mobilize  the  most  important  Italian  industries  as  fully  as
necessary.37 As  Valerio  Castronovo's  work  on  Fiat  shows,  Italian
industrialists  took  advantage of  the state  of  non-belligerence declared by
Mussolini  in  September  1939  to  make  deals  with  countries  that  would
become Italy's enemies a year later. Moreover, they did not play the kind of
leading role in Italian foreign policy that they had assumed in 1915.38 Similar
difficulties concerned the militarization of industry, established by a law of
32. Ibid., p. 24.
33. Air Ministry, "Promemoria. Osservazioni agli aeroplani prescelti per le commesse di
previsione," 5 November 1937, MA, 1937, b. 25, cl. 3, s.cl. V, cart. 2, ACS.
34. Air Ministry to Air Chiefs of Staff, 19 July 1937, MA, 1937, b. 25, cl. 3, s.cl. V, cart.
2, ACS.
35. Christopher Dunning,  Courage Alone: The Italian Air Force 1940–1943 (London:
Hikoki  Publications,  2009),  pp.  273-76;  Ministry  of  Information,  What  Britain  has
Done,  1939–1945:  A  Selection  of  Outstanding  Facts  and  Figures  (London:  Atlantic
Books, 2007; originally published 1945), pp. 103-04.
36. MacGregor Knox,  Alleati  di  Hitler. Le regie forze armate, il regime fascista e la
guerra del 1940–1943 (Milan: Garzanti, 2002), pp. 51-52.
37. Lucio Ceva, Storia delle forze armate in Italia (Turin: UTET, 1999), pp. 276-77.
38. Castronovo, Fiat 1899–1999, pp. 574-83.
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18 June 1940, but subsequently repealed by another on 24 August 1941—an
outcome that  illustrated the weakness  of  a  regime in  constant  search  for
popular support.39 Mussolini's fear of losing popularity meant that no major
changes were imposed on the home front when he decided to enter the war
during the successful German campaign in France in June 1940. Despite
requests  by the  armed  forces,  the  dictator  avoided  any major  attempt  to
enforce  military  discipline  on  the  industrial  working  class  until  January
1943, in contrast to the actions of the Liberal ruling class in the First World
War.40
As Giorgio Rochat has noted, the problem was not merely one of means,
but also of military culture. There was an immeasurable gap between, on the
one hand, the ambitions, the propaganda campaigns, and the  image of an
internationally competitive aviation, and, on the other, the real industrial and
financial  capacities  of  the  regime.41 Air  defense  was a  clear  example.  In
January 1940, General Carlo Favagrossa, head of the Commissariat for War
Production,  declared  that  an  appropriate  renewal  of  anti-aircraft  artillery
would  only  be  achieved  after  1945  at  best.42 Although  the  Supreme
Commander,  Pietro  Badoglio,  together  with   the  three  service  Chiefs  of
Staff,  Domenico  Cavagnari  (Navy),  Rodolfo  Graziani  (Army),  and
Francesco  Pricolo  (Air  Force),  tried  to  warn  Mussolini  about  the  armed
forces' lack of preparedness (Pricolo even raised doubts about the usefulness
of entering the conflict in summer 1940 given the technical difficulties of
facing an air war), the decision to go to war was based solely on a political
evaluation, as if it could somehow be won independent of military means.
The  declaration  of  war  reflected  wishful  thinking  that  the  regime  was
already on the winning side.43
Industrialists, too, increasingly criticized air defense measures. In some
cases,  they observed  that  most  plans  to  camouflage  factories  and  power
stations were not  practical;  anti-aircraft  guns were needed instead.44 This
was not the only problem facing industry. The Air Ministry realized as early
as April 1938 that the Italian aviation industry was hampered by a lack of
modern machinery. But because of government concern about the morale of
the working classes, it was considered dangerous to introduce machinery in
order to begin mass production, as it would risk the unemployment of too
39. Andrea Curami,  "L'industria  bellica prima dell'8  settembre,"  Italia  contemporanea
261 (December 2010), p. 673.
40. Knox, Alleati di Hitler, pp. 43-44.
41. Giorgio  Rochat,  Le guerre italiane 1935–1943.  Dall'impero d'Etiopia alla disfatta
(Turin: Einaudi, 2005), p. 231.
42. Lucio  Ceva, Guerra  mondiale.  Strategie  e  industria  bellica,  1939–1945  (Milan:
Angeli, 2000), p. 31.
43. Fortunato Minniti,  "Profilo dell'iniziativa strategica italiana dalla 'non belligeranza'
alla 'guerra parallela,'" Storia contemporanea 18:6 (December 1987), pp. 1158-59, 1163.
44. Informer's  report,  Bagnaia  di  Viterbo,  2  February  1940,  Ministero  dell'Interno
(hereinafter MI), Direzione Generale Pubblica Sicurezza (hereinafter DGPS), Divisione
Polizia Politica (hereinafter DPP), b. 210, ACS.
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many skilled workers. Even though the Air Ministry warned the Air Staff
that  this  might  become necessary in  order  to  facilitate  the  shift  to  mass
production with the advent of war, little was done.45 As a consequence of a
mentality more sympathetic to traditional labor skills, no serial production
was genuinely pursued  in  Italy;  British,  German,  American,  and Russian
aircraft  were  standardized  and  mass-produced,  but  Italian  aircraft  were
manufactured in small packets by what amounted to artisanal methods. The
slow adaptation of Italian industry to the latest technology also resulted in
the failure to construct more powerful engines as well as in delays in the
production of onboard instrumentation, radio, and high-octane fuel.46 By the
autumn of  1939,  all  firms  working  for  the  Air  Force  continued  to  send
requests for raw materials to the Air Ministry; the progressive exhaustion of
such resources led the ministry to forecast a short-term production crisis.47
While  government  directives  insisted  on  incremental  increases  in
production,  material  shortages  threatened  instead  to  slow  it  down.48
Moreover, the Air Force was deemed to be third in order of precedence in
granting supplies for the armed forces, behind the Navy and the Army.49
Consistent with the regime's autarchic ideology and with Mussolini's idea
of  a  "parallel  war"  alongside  that  of  his  German  ally,  the  predominant
feeling was that there was no need to ask Germany for direct assistance for
Italy's air  defenses;  an  excessively optimistic  belief  in  Italian capacity to
supply equipment meant continued reliance chiefly on Italian production. In
April 1940, Italy's foreign minister, Galeazzo Ciano, instructed the Italian
Ambassador to Berlin, Bernardo Attolico, to inform Hermann Göring that
Italy,  though  satisfied  with  the  100  anti-aircraft  batteries  it  had  so  far
received from Germany, did not require further assistance since, "we already
have at our disposal 425 anti-aircraft batteries and a total of 1,700 guns and
around  5-6,000  anti-aircraft  machine-guns."  Moreover,  Ciano  concluded:
"We are currently constructing the new and ultimate 90mm cannon."50 Even
when this argument became clearly unsustainable later in the war, Italian
authorities still preferred to protect Italian interests. For example, although
the Germans had been installing radar in Italy since 1941, in the summer of
1942, the Air Ministry,  echoing an opinion expressed by the Ministry of
Corporations,  insisted  that  the  establishment  of  a  German  Telefunken
45. "Potenzialità industriale," Air Ministry to Air Chiefs of Staff, 28 April 1938,  MA,
1938, b. 28, cl. 3, scl. V, cartella 5, ACS.
46. Rochat, Le guerre italiane, pp. 232-33.
47. "Materie  prime,"  Air  Ministry  to  General  Commissariat  for  War  Production,  10
November 1939, MA, 1939, b. 33, cl. 3, scl. V, cartella 18, ACS.
48. "Assegnazione  materie  prime,"  Air  Ministry  to  General  Carlo  Favagrossa,  13
November 1939, MA, 1939, b. 33, cl. 3, scl. V, cartella 18, ACS.
49. "Materie  prime,"  Air  Ministry,  General  Direction  of  Supplies,  to  the  Ministry's
Cabinet, 8 November 1939, MA, 1939, b. 33, cl. 3, scl. V, cartella 18, ACS.
50. Galeazzo Ciano to Bernardo Attolico,  4 April 1940,  Ministero degli  Affari Esteri,
Documenti  diplomatici  italiani (hereinafter  DDI), nona  serie,  1939–1943,  Vol.  3  (1
January‒8 April 1940), p. 610.
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factory in Italy would be damaging to Italian industrial interests and that it
would be better to ask the German Air Ministry to give the contract to Italian
firms  so  they could  produce  radar  themselves.51 However,  such  attempts
were short-lived and, following the shift from "parallel" to "subaltern" war,
Mussolini's  efforts  to  direct  his  own  war  and  win  victory  in  the
Mediterranean without German assistance were replaced by ever-increasing
requests for help from Italy's ally.52
Preparation for War: The Defense of Industry and the Air Force
At  the  end  of  1936,  the  War  Ministry  informed  the  DiCaT  that  it  was
currently impossible to defend the 152 industrial objectives that had been
previously chosen, but that instead thirty-eight air bases and fifteen fuel and
munitions depots had been selected for protection. Thus far, no defense had
been envisaged for private firms working on aviation contracts because the
ministry  hoped  that  industrialists,  subject  to  "an  opportune  action  of
propaganda,"  would  agree  to  bear  the  costs.  It  was  decided  that  the
following was needed:
1) For fuel and munitions depots – anti-aircraft batteries of four 76mm
heavy guns and units drawn from 139 20mm light guns.
2) For air bases – 370 20mm light guns.  To this, 90 further  units of
20mm light guns (equal to 20%) must be added.
Financially, this rather limited program of defense resulted in the following
request:
For weapons:
1st installment – L. 20,000,000
2nd installment – L. 48,000,000
3rd installment – L. 12,000,000
For munitions:
Approximately L. 56,000,000 per year for four years.53
Three years later, with the war in Europe underway, the War Ministry
clarified that it was still not possible to specify when batteries of the new
75mm  heavy  anti-aircraft  gun  needed  for  the  defense  of  air  bases  and
aviation objectives might be available because that depended on how many
industry would be able to deliver over the following two years.54 Instead,
51. "Riproduzione in Italia di apparati radiolocalizzatori," Air Ministry to the Air attaché
to the Italian Embassy to Berlin, 1 August 1942, MA, 1942, b. 23, cl. 2, s.cl. V, cartella
18 (Radiolocalizzatori), vol. II,  ACS.
52. Knox, Alleati di Hitler, p. 30.
53. War Ministry to Chiefs of Staff for Territorial  Defense,  30 December 1936,  MA,
1937, b. 25, cl. 3, s.cl. V, cartella 4, ACS.
54. "Difesa  contraerei  aeroporti  e  obiettivi  di  interesse  aeronautico,"  War  Ministry,
Territorial Defense, to the Ministry's Cabinet and to the Air Ministry, 8 November 1939,
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these targets still depended on the 76mm gun, first used in 1916 during the
First World War,  and the light 20mm Breda guns laid down in the 1936
directive,  neither  of  which  were  effective  against  modern,  high-flying
bomber aircraft.
One  of  the  issues  that  particularly  worried  the  Air  Ministry  was  the
concentration of Italian industry in the same geographical areas, which made
it both more vulnerable to air attack and more difficult to defend. The need
for some industrial relocation was recognized in a 1938 plan to disperse the
aeronautical industries so that, by July 1940, 50% would be located to the
north of the river Po and 50% to the south. At that point, industries north of
the  Po  produced  three-quarters  of  the  total  national  output.  Existing
industries in the center-south that were worth maintaining would have to be
augmented, and new industrial centers created, while some of the northern
firms were to prepare for transfer to the south. The state would provide an
extraordinary one-off contribution of one million lire towards the costs of
industrial  production  on  the  condition  that  each  affected  firm  would
organize a partial move south.55 No further documents on the matter confirm
that  the  measure  was  successfully  implemented  by  the  intended  date.
Aviation firms were still  resisting the dispersal  of  their  production when
heavy bombing began in the winter of 1942-43.
The idea that industrialists would voluntarily collaborate in the defense of
the country out of patriotic duty was also at the heart of a decree discussed
by the War Ministry in the summer of the same year, 1938. An agreement
between the state and the Banca Nazionale del Lavoro facilitated loans to
firms that needed to be defended in case of air attack; industrialists were
expected to fund anti-aircraft batteries on their own behalf as an expression
of their "responsible foresight" and their will to contribute to the higher good
of the nation. This was deemed to be realistic given the "national climate
created by the regime." Not only were industrialists called on to collaborate
in the country's defense by organizing the anti-aircraft protection of their
own factories, but they were also asked to surrender the defenses they thus
acquired to the state, which, through the agency of the War Ministry and the
DiCaT,  would manage and operate  them.56 No documents show  that  this
scheme was conducted successfully either.
A plan discussed by the Air Ministry a year later envisaged the need to
defend sixty-two aviation objectives, including "fuel depots, munitions and
air bases," at a cost of 244 million lire. The proposal was to begin with the
fifteen most crucial objectives, which required a more modest 116 million
MA, 1939, b. 33, cl. 3, scl. V, cartella 25, ACS.
55. Promemoria  of  Air  Ministry on  industrial  relocation  to  the  South,  13  September
1938, MA, 1938, b. 28, cl. 3, scl. V, cartella 5, ACS.
56. "Schema di R. decreto legge. Approvazione della convenzione fra lo Stato e la Banca
Nazionale del Lavoro circa il finanziamento della organizzazione per la difesa contraerea
delle industrie e di altre attività nazionali," War Ministry, 8 August 1938, MA, 1938, b.
28, cl. 3, scl. V, cartella 5, ACS.
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lire.57 Badoglio brought the request to Mussolini's attention, and the latter
agreed on an installment of 116 million lire for the air defense of air bases
and  other  essential  aviation  targets  in  October  1939.58 However,  as  a
consequence of  the increased price of raw materials and the rising wage
costs  of  skilled labor,  the DiCaT reported that  such a sum only made it
possible to organize air defenses to protect the following objectives:
1) The Study Center at Guidonia
2) Fuel depot at Fornovo Taro
3) Munitions depot at Collecchio (Parma)
4) Munitions depot at Monte Mannu (Samassi-Cagliari)
5) Munitions depot at Bassano in Teverina
6) Fuel depot at Novi Ligure
7) Munitions depot at Sanguinetto (Legnano)
8) Munitions depot at Tripoli (Bir Sbea)
9) Munitions depot at Bengazi (Regina)
10) Fuel depot at Porto S. Stefano.59
In  July  1939,  the  War  Ministry  warned  the  Supreme  Commission  of
Defense and the Air Ministry that a minimum program for the air defense of
aeronautical  objectives  would  require  160  million  lire  and  could  not  be
completed before the end of 1941. This program included the acquisition of
weapons that were considered "strictly indispensable," but some of which
were still in the development stage: the new 90mm heavy anti-aircraft gun
and 20mm light  guns  to  cover six  objectives of  vital  importance;  37mm
cannons for twelve extremely important objectives;  and 20mm light anti-
aircraft guns for forty-eight important objectives.
By  this  stage,  Italian  engineers  had  developed  what  was  generally
regarded during the war as one of the finest anti-aircraft weapons, the 90mm
heavy gun,  which  also  later  doubled  as  an  anti-tank  weapon.  However,
although more than 1,700 were ordered, only 539 were manufactured, and
without  effective  radar  control  or  proximity  fuses  for  its  shells,  its  full
potential was never realized. In the end, Italian defenses relied heavily on
the 1916 76mm model, of which almost 500 were produced during the war.
Cost was certainly a key consideration. It was calculated that to provide an
57. "Difesa contraerei aeroporti e obiettivi di interesse aeronautico," War Ministry to the
General Commander of the Armed Forces and to the Air Ministry, 20 September 1939,
MA, 1939, b. 33, cl. 3, scl. V, cartella 25, ACS.
58. "Difesa contraerei aeroporti e obiettivi di interesse aeronautico," Pietro Badoglio to
the Chiefs of Staff of the Army and of the Air Force, 15 October 1939, MA, 1939, b. 33,
cl. 3, scl. V, cartella 25, ACS.
59. "Difesa contraerea degli obiettivi di preminente interesse della R. Aeronautica," War
Ministry,  Territorial  Defense,  to  the  Ministry's  Cabinet  and  the  Air  Ministry,  29
November 1939, MA, 1939, b. 33, cl. 3, scl. V, cartella 25, ACS.
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adequate  program to  meet  aeronautical  requirements  would  necessitate  a
total cost of 740 million lire. However, Mussolini made it clear that for the
time being he could not assign any further funds for air defense and the
fixed artillery continued to rely on obsolescent models.60
The First Phase: 1940‒1942
As Lucio Ceva has noted, the conditions under which Italy entered the war
on 10 June 1940 could not  be compared with the circumstances of  May
1915,  when  Italy  joined  an  international  coalition  sustained  by  colossal
empires. Between 1940 and 1943, Italy's German ally, owing to the demands
on its own resources made necessary by the extensive and brutal character of
its  imperialism,  could  only  provide  military  and  material  assistance  that
barely  guaranteed  Italian  survival.61 Resistance  to  Italian  requests  for
machinery and weapons was evident from the beginning of the conflict. In
the  summer  of  1940,  Favagrossa  raised  with  Mussolini  the  necessity  of
coming to a "totalitarian solution of raw material supplies" in order to avoid
a situation in which Italy found  itself in "constant conditions of inferiority to
Germany,"  compelled  to  make  continuous  future  requests  for  material.62
Exchanges in the spring of 1941 between the Italian foreign office, Italian
diplomats in Berlin, and Hermann Göring showed that the German attitude
did not in fact encourage Italian requests. At that time, Göring, head of the
German  Four-Year  Plan  organization,  made  clear  that  he  would  only
authorize the shipping of machines that were not necessary for German war
production, and only as long as they were "limited to the real needs" of the
Italian armaments industry.63
Italy's delays in preparing adequate air protection resulted in the fact that
a  number  of  early raids  carried  out  by the  RAF could  not  be  countered
effectively.  RAF Malta  reports  on  raids  on  southern  Italian  cities  in  the
autumn of  1940  are  eloquent. A  raid  on  Naples  during  the  night  of  31
October/1  November  found  no  enemy  aircraft  defending  the  city,  "no
searchlights  and  inaccurate  anti-aircraft  fire."64 When  ten  Wellingtons
attacked the port and fuel depots at Taranto on 13 November, they found "no
searchlights, inaccurate anti-aircraft fire, no balloons and no enemy aircraft."
So insignificant was the opposition that the RAF was able to bomb from
much  lower  heights  than  usual  (5,000-7,000  feet)—the  usual  bombing
60. "Difesa  contraerei  degli  impianti  e  degli  obiettivi  di  interesse  aeronautico,"  War
Ministry to the Supreme Committee of Defense and to the Air Ministry, 13 July 1939,
MA, 1939, b. 33, cl. 3, scl. V, cartella 25, ACS.
61. Ceva, Storia delle forze armate, p. 275.
62. Favagrossa to Mussolini, 4 August 1940, DDI, Vol. 5 (11 June‒28 October 1940),
pp. 343-45.
63. Coordinating Office in Berlin to Ciano, 16 March 1941, DDI,  Vol.  6 (29 October
1940‒23 April 1941),  p. 366.
64. HQ RAF Mediterranean to Bomber Command HQ, 11 November 1940, AIR 2/7397,
The National Archives, London (hereinafter TNA).
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height  against  heavily-defended  targets  was  15-20,000  feet.65 Two  days
earlier,  the  British  had  scored  a  clear  success  when  twenty-one  Fairey
Swordfish torpedo bombers attacked the Italian fleet at anchor in Taranto,
sinking  or  seriously damaging  three  battleships  and  a  heavy cruiser,  and
substantially  diminishing  the  Italian  threat  to  British  vessels  in  the
Mediterranean. The  Italian  press  denied  the  damage  to  Italian  vessels,
reporting that enemy forces had failed to penetrate Italian defenses, or had
been hit in retaliation. This policy of denial had a disastrous effect once the
truth began to spread. Not only could the local population see the damage,
which  clearly  contradicted articles in the southern newspaper  La Gazzetta
del  Mezzogiorno,  but  news  of  Taranto  traveled  across  Italy  as  soldiers
stationed there were moved to military bases elsewhere.66
During the  same month,  ten Wellingtons also  bombed Bari,  and RAF
headquarters  in  Malta  again  reported  that  Italian  anti-aircraft  fire  was
inaccurate,  and  that  there  were  no  balloons,  searchlights,  or  fighters;
moreover, the blackout was poor in "all areas" and "trains well lit."67 The
fact that Allied reports usually mentioned weaknesses in both the active and
passive  defenses  suggests  that  the  two  must  be  regarded  as  connected
elements in Italy's lack of preparation for war.  The difficulty of imposing
respect  for  the blackout,  for  example,  was mentioned in  prefects'  reports
throughout the entire war period; RAF pilots crossing the Alps during the
very first bombing operations in Italy were aware of this when they reported
the welcome sight of Milan and Genoa fully illuminated.68 Non-compliance
with the blackout is evident not only from prefects' letters, but also from
newspaper articles and numerous reports in the files of the Ministry of  the
Interior and the Air Ministry that cite problems of public order.69 Although
non-compliance need not be interpreted as a form of active opposition to
Fascism,  it  was  an  indication  of  the  population's  poor  commitment  and
limited  willingness  to  adapt  to  the  war  situation.  Although  this  article
focuses mostly on Italy's military performance,  the responses of  both the
population and military to the air war need to be seen as part of the same
problem.
Before  the  raids  of  autumn  1940,  Dino  Alfieri,  who  had  replaced
65. HQ RAF Malta to HQ RAF Mediterranean, 14 November 1940, AIR 2/7397, TNA.
66. See "Operazioni  belliche e spirito  pubblico,"  Prefect of La Spezia to  Ministry of
Interior, 15 November 1940; "La difesa di Taranto abbatte sei aerei nemici," La Gazzetta
del  Mezzogiorno,  13  November  1940,  p.  1,  MI,  DGPS,  Seconda  Guerra  Mondiale
(IIGM), A5G, b. 25, ACS.
67. HQ RAF Malta to HQ RAF Mediterranean, 23 November 1940, AIR 2/7397, TNA;
Richard Overy,  The Bombing War: Europe 1939–1945 (London: Allen Lane, 2013), p.
512.
68. Richard Overy,  Bomber Command,  1939–1945 (London:  HarperCollins,  1997),  p.
86.
69. Claudia Baldoli and Marco Fincardi, "Italian Society under Anglo-American Bombs:
Propaganda, Experience, and Legend, 1940–1945," The Historical Journal 52:4 (2009),
p. 1026.
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Bernardo Attolico  as  Ambassador  to  Berlin  in  May,  had  sought  to  alert
Joachim  von  Ribbentrop  to  the  serious  conditions  Italy  was  facing,  in
particular its lack of raw materials and fuel. The German foreign minister
replied  that  decisions  were  taken  at  the  military  level  for  unavoidable
reasons and were not his responsibility; moreover, he raised concerns about
rumors in Germany concerning the alleged incidence of low Italian morale
and popular discontent.70 In Germany, too, it was perceived that the Italian
military and home fronts were not up to the task they faced. However, in
order to defend their own bomber bases in Italy, established in the winter of
1940-41  and  then  extended  to  North  Africa,  the  Luftwaffe deployed  a
number of anti-aircraft units there from April 1941 onwards. The German
10th  Air  Corps  divided  the  units  up  as  follows:  "Catania  –  5  batteries;
Comiso  –  5  batteries;  Trapani  –  4  batteries;  Palermo  –  1  battery;
Catania/Reggio  Calabria  –  5  batteries;  Sirte  –  1  battery;  El  Mechili  –  2
batteries."71 In addition to these units, the Reich Air Ministry in August 1941
offered the Italian Air Ministry five German balloons to be deployed "in one
port in southern Italy."72
German contributions played an influential role in the course of the war in
the Mediterranean and North Africa. However, from June 1941, the invasion
of Russia took priority and absorbed most of the  Luftwaffe's energies.73 As
soon as the Germans withdrew some of their forces from Sicilian airfields,
the responsibility for air defense fell to the  Regia Aeronautica, a fact that
resulted in increased British attacks from Malta on the Sicilian convoys.74 By
September 1941, for  example,  the air defenses at the air  base at Comiso
(which  housed  a  great  many fighters  and  bombers)  were  limited  to  four
20mm guns only capable of firing to a height of 2,000 meters (around 6,500
feet).75
In October 1941, as the military campaign on the Eastern Front slowed
down  due  to  the  worsening  autumn  weather,  Hitler  sent  more  air  force
support to southern Italy. At the end of November,  Field Marshal Albert
Kesselring moved to Italy to coordinate with the Italian military authorities,
and, in December, the first groups of the II Fliegerkorps were established at
the Sicilian air bases of Catania, Gerbini, Gela, San Pietro di Caltagirone,
Sciacca, Trapani, and Comiso. On the mainland, the air bases of Bari and
70. Alfieri to Ciano, 13 September 1941, DDI, Vol. 7 (24 April‒11 December 1941), pp.
567-69.
71. "Dislocazione  Reparti  di  Volo  del  Corpo  Aereo  Tedesco,"  15  April  1941,  Box
14/E2545, Imperial War Museum (hereinafter IWM).
72. "Attrezzi  per  lo  sbarramento  aereo,"  Deutsche  Botschaft  des  Luftattaché  to  War
Ministry, 26 August 1941, MA, 1941, b. 50, cl. 3, s.cl. V, cartella 5, ACS.
73. Williamson  Murray,  The  Luftwaffe,  1933–1945:  Strategy  for  Defeat (London:
Brassey's, 1996), pp. 74-100.
74. Natalini, I rapporti tra aeronautica italiana e tedesca, p. 77.
75. "Segnalazione," Fascist Party Inspector Angelo Manaresi, Coordinating Office to the
Armed Forces (HQ in Littoria), to Air Ministry, 15 September 1941, MA, 1941, b. 50, cl.
3, s.cl. V, cartella 5, ACS.
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Brindisi were made available for logistics and Capodichino at Naples for
storage.  The  aim of all  this  was to  ensure  deliveries  to  North Africa,  to
support the troops deployed there, and to attack Malta. Over the following
months,  almost  all  air  activity  against  Malta  was  carried  out  by  the
Luftwaffe.76
As a result of the increase in German bombing bases, more anti-aircraft
defenses were also brought to southern Italy.77 Indeed, by the end of 1941,
not all Allied raids on southern Italian cities were successful due, according
to RAF reports, not only to a lack of accuracy on the part of the RAF but
also  to  the  fact  that  on  a  few  occasions  Italian  defenses  seemed  to  be
improving—as demonstrated, for example, by the smokescreen over the port
of Naples in early December.78 Nevertheless, the majority of RAF reports
continued to mention the lack of intense anti-aircraft fire, fighter attacks, and
balloons. It was generally safe to bomb from 9,000 feet.79
Instructions  from  Superaereo (the  supreme  command  of  the  Regia
Aeronautica from June  1940)  to  air  bases  throughout  Italy in  December
1941 made clear  that  much still  needed to be done.  Alongside the usual
rhetorical claim that "the experience of war advises the organisation of the
defense of air bases in a totalitarian fashion," the instructions established
that the Army and Navy had responsibility for anti-aircraft artillery defense
against  high  altitude  bombers,  while  the  Air  Force  was  responsible  for
combating lower altitude attacks using fighter  aircraft.  Depending on the
importance  of  the  air  base,  a  mix  of  47mm  anti-aircraft  guns,  20mm
cannons, and small and medium caliber batteries were to be delivered. The
use of the future tense and absence of details about when the material might
be provided must have generated a sense of uncertainty, since it was stated
that deliveries would be gradual and depend upon availability, and that in
the first instance the new defensive measures would only apply to the most
important  and  sensitive  ports—those  under  attack  in  that  phase  of  the
Mediterranean war in Sicily, Sardinia, and southern Italy, in particular.80
Radar
Although Italian research and experiments with radar had been progressing
in  the  interwar  years  alongside  developments  in  Germany,  Britain,  and
France, its realization was interrupted by the war, and was never given the
76. Natalini, I rapporti tra aeronautica italiana e tedesca, pp. 80, 86, 88.
77. "Difesa degli aeroporti," Air Chiefs of Staff, Superaereo, to Air commanders located
in various parts of Italy, 1 January 1942, MA, 1942, b. 46, cl. 3, s.cl. V, cartella 11, ACS.
78. Note from Baker  (Director  of Bombing  Operations,  Air  Ministry)  to  Admiral  Sir
Dudley Pound  (First  Sea Lord),  4  December  1941;  HQ RAF Malta  to  Air  Ministry
(DBOps), 9 December 1941, AIR 2/7397, TNA.
79. HQ RAF Malta, report on Wellington operations 27-28 November 1941; HQ RAF
Malta, report on Wellington operations 5-6 December 1941, AIR 23/5752, TNA.
80. "Difesa degli aeroporti," Air Chiefs of Staff, Superaereo, to Air commanders located
in various parts of Italy, 3 December 1941, MA, 1942, b. 46, cl. 3, s.cl. V, cartella 11,
ACS.
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necessary  priority  by  the  military  authorities.81 It  was  the  Luftwaffe that
brought  radar  to  Italy,  initially  in  order  to  cover  Field  Marshal  Erwin
Rommel's path to Tripoli early in 1941. However, no integrated system of
defense  between  radar,  fighters,  and  artillery  (which  would  have  meant
coordination  between Air  Force,  Army,  Navy,  and militia)  was seriously
discussed before 1942.82 In December 1941, a mixed  committee consisting
of  officers from  the  three  armed  forces  was  created  with  the  aim  of
organizing  more  effective  air  defenses.  The  establishment  of  a  training
center was proposed in order to support the technical education of personnel
in the correct use of radar. The  Luftwaffe undertook to provide its Italian
counterpart with fifteen radar installations—five Freyas and 10 Würzburgs.
The  Freya model  worked  with  a  2.4  meter  wavelength  and  could  detect
aircraft up to a distance  of 150km, while the Würzburg model functioned
with a 50cm wavelength to a distance of 40km. The latter could determine
the altitude of the aircraft as well as its geographical position. In practice,
the two types complemented each other. Freyas could explore an entire area
and identify oncoming aircraft;  when these  aircraft  entered  the  radius  of
action  of  the  Würzburg  radar,  their  route  could  be  followed  with  exact
precision, making it possible to direct either the defending fighters or the
anti-aircraft batteries.83
The importance of radar was evident, since it could be used to direct both
day and night fighters for interception of enemy aircraft. The installations
had to be located near anti-aircraft batteries and connected by telephone to
other  batteries  in  the  same area.  However,  the  Italian  embassy in  Berlin
exhibited some caution.  First  of  all,  as  a  letter  to  Superaereo explained,
because  the  Würzburg  radar  manufactured  by  Telefunken  would  not  be
available before April 1942, ten similar experimental devices built by the
German  Lorenz  company  were  to  be  sent  to  Italy  instead.  Secondly,
although these were suitable for connection with anti-aircraft artillery, the
connection would work only as long as the Italians had a fitting switchboard.
At this point in the letter, a question mark was inserted, suggesting that there
was little clarity in Italy about how to employ such instruments.84
At the end of 1941, it was decided that three Freya devices were to be
deployed  respectively at  Pantelleria,  Lampedusa,  and  Tripoli  in  order  to
protect the convoys between Tripoli and Sicily; one at Capo S. Antioco in
Sardinia to protect Sardinian bases; and one in the Rome area to integrate
defense  of  the  capital.  The  Würzburg  units  were  to  be  assigned  to  the
81. Luigi Carillo Castioni, "I radar industriali italiani. Ricerche, ricordi, considerazioni
per una loro storia," Storia contemporanea 18:6 (December 1987), p. 1222.
82. Knox, Alleati di Hitler, p. 76.
83. "Ricerca notturna  degli  aerei," Air Ministry to  War Ministry,  11 December 1941,
(Radiolocalizzatori), vol. I, MA, 1942, b. 23, cl. 2, s.cl. V, cartella 18, ACS.
84. "Radiolocalizzatori  –  Fornitura  e  corsi  d'istruzione,"  Italian  Embassy,  Berlin,  to
Superaereo and Air Ministry, 26 November 1941, (Radiolocalizzatori), vol. I, MA, 1942,
b. 23, cl. 2, s.cl. V, cartella 18, ACS.
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protection of important bases that were likely to  be subject  to  enemy air
attack; to localities that, because of their geographical position, were suitable
for  Italian  fighter  interception;  and  to  places  that  would  complement
identical installations already controlled by the Germans. It was thus decided
that two of them would be installed near Rome (one at Anzio and one at
Ostia) for the defense of the capital and for use by the new school to be
created there, and one each at Naples, Pantelleria, Tripoli, Palermo, Bengasi,
Crotone, Brindisi, and Cagliari. The first four Würzburg units were already
on their way to Italy to be positioned at Anzio, Ostia, Naples, and Tripoli.
However, it was recognized that in order to obtain useful results from the
establishment of radar, it was necessary to begin training personnel. The first
training  courses  for  Italian  personnel  were  established  in  Germany  in
November 1941, and were to be attended by ten groups, four organized by
the Air Force, three by the Army, and three by the Navy.85
The  Berlin  school  of  anti-aircraft  artillery  hosted  an  initial  six-week
course on the use of Würzburg radar starting in mid-December. Each team
was  composed  of  eleven  members,  four  of  whom  were  expected  to  be
specialists. Meanwhile, the first Freya course began on 10 December at the
Experimental  Regiment  of  Telecommunications  at  Köthen  and  was  also
intended to last for six weeks, with teams composed in the same way. Italian
personnel were required not so much to possess a firm practical knowledge
of the field of high frequency technology but to demonstrate intelligence,
mental acuteness, and the capacity to maintain the strictest secrecy. On top
of these qualities, a good technical competence was, however, required of
non-commissioned officers and some of the mechanical operators in each
team. Some of the participants had to know German, although an interpreter
was also necessary. In return for providing the course, the  Luftwaffe asked
that  thirty  technicians  skilled  in  high  frequency  and  forty  skilled
electrotechnical mechanics be sent from Italy for test and inspection works
to  be  carried  out  in  Germany.  However,  the  Italian  Air  Force  made  it
immediately clear that it would be impossible to release such a high number
of skilled workers to meet German requirements.86
Following the loss of much of the Italian empire in Africa by the end of
1941,  it  proved difficult  to  disguise  evident  discontent  with  the  military
situation and the Axis alliance among the military recruits for the courses in
Germany—a  predicament  that  provoked  anxiety  for  the  Italian  Supreme
Command. After the first courses had finished in March 1942, an alarmed
Cavallero wrote to the Chiefs of Staff of the three armed forces, reporting
cases of indiscipline by Italians sent to Germany and giving instructions on
how to  avoid  these  in  the  future.  In  addition  to  the  necessary  qualities
already designated, Cavallero recommended a stricter selection with regards
to standards of discipline and seriousness of intent, neither of which could
85. "Verbale  relativo  alla  riunione  tenuta  il  14  dicembre  1941-XX  per  esaminare  i
problemi inerenti i radiolocalizzatori," MA, 1942, b. 23, cl. 2, s.cl. V, cartella 18, ACS.
86. "Radiolocalizzatori – Fornitura e corsi d'istruzione," 26 November 1941, ACS.
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any longer be taken for granted.87 The Air Ministry suggested appointing a
team leader—the highest ranking,  oldest,  and most senior officer in each
case—as disciplinary controller for each group.88 From the very first days of
the  radar  courses,  it  was  understood  that  relations  between  German  and
Italian troops "had not been cordial." Besides a few impolite words, there
had  been  an  exchange  of  views  on  the  war  in  which  Italian  soldiers
demonstrated anti-patriotic opinions. It was observed that the mass of Italian
soldiers were "educated to a formal discipline that was less correct than that
of the German ones," and officers did not appear to be up to their task.89 The
personnel enrolled in the course, according to Cavallero, did not possess the
necessary  characteristics  of  military  preparation  and  cohesion.  Some  of
them, so it appeared, had even talked to German airmen about a separate
peace and, ungrateful for the services provided by their allies, complained
about the quality of the meals.90
Despite the attempt to present these as isolated cases, a similar attitude
among the Italians in Germany—whether on the part of  emigrants or war
workers—had  been  observed  by  Italian  diplomats  in  Germany  from  the
outbreak of war. The ambassador to Berlin, Bernardo Attolico, for example,
had written to Foreign Minister Ciano a few days after the outbreak of the
Second World War to warn him about an openly anti-German state of mind
among  the  majority  in  the  Italian  communities  living  there,  and  the
resentment this provoked among their German hosts. Attolico had even had
to  intervene  with  the  Italian  Fascio in  Berlin,  threatening  to  suspend its
refectory  and  withdraw  the  Fascist  party  card  from individuals  in  cases
where they were involved in spreading anti-German rumors; elsewhere, he
organized gatherings in an attempt to familiarize the local Italian population
with the Fascist "catechism," and instructed consuls across the country on
the need to control their communities.91 A year later, the new ambassador,
Alfieri,  informed Ciano that no serious selection process had taken place
when  sending  Italian  workers  to  Germany  to  replace  German  soldiers
leaving for the front. Italian workers complained about almost every aspect
of  the  limitations  in  daily  life:  food,  clothing,  heating,  bedding,  soap,
alcohol,  tobacco,  and so on.  The  German population,  he concluded, was
87. "Corso nell'impiego dei radiolocalizzatori,"  Supreme Commander Ugo Cavallero to
the Chiefs of Staff of the Army, Navy and Air Force, 7 March 1942, (Radiolocalizzatori),
vol. II, MA, 1942, b. 23, cl. 2, s.cl. V, cartella 18, ACS.
88. "Corso sull'impiego dei radiolocalizzatori," Air Ministry to the Supreme Commander,
April 1942, (Radiolocalizzatori), vol. II, MA, 1942, b. 23, cl. 2, s.cl. V, cartella 18, ACS.
89. "Relazione  (Riferimento  al  foglio  n.  111  del  19  febbraio  1942-XX del  Comando
Supremo," 25 February 1942, (Radiolocalizzatori), vol. II, MA, 1942, b. 23, cl. 2, s.cl. V,
cartella 18, ACS.
90. "Corso nell'impiego dei radiolocalizzatori," Cavallero to the Chiefs of Staff of the
Army, Navy and Air Force, 19 February 1942, (Radiolocalizzatori), vol. II, MA, 1942, b.
23, cl. 2, s.cl. V, cartella 18, ACS.
91. Attolico to Ciano, 7 September 1939, DDI, Vol. 1 (4 September‒24 October 1939),
p. 48.
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hostile because Italians were perceived to be doing safe jobs while Germans
were dying at the front in part to defend Italian territory, an attitude that in
turn  only  provoked  further  negative  reactions  among  Italian  workers.92
German mistrust was based not only on these reactions, both from Italians
living in  Germany and those who attended the training courses,  but  also
from rumors about the Italian population's more general lack of support for
the war and for the Axis alliance. The situation was exacerbated after it was
revealed in a telegram from Colonel Giuseppe Teucci, air attaché in Berlin,
to  Superaereo in December 1941 that  Italian firms had begun requesting
warrants from German companies so that they could begin producing radar
equipment themselves. German firms were extremely worried about the fact
that  the  necessarily secret  character  of  their  products  had  evidently been
ignored  in  Italy,  since  Italian  firms  should  not  have  had  access  to  the
technical information in the first place. The Germans believed, with some
justice, that Italian firms could not be trusted even to maintain the most basic
level of confidentiality.93
The Heavy Raids of 1942–1943
Comparing  Italy's  industrial  mobilization  and  war  production  in  the  two
world conflicts, Andrea Curami demonstrated that, while at the time of the
battle of Vittorio Veneto in 1918 the armed forces fought with weapons and
equipment that were substantial improvements on the equipment available in
1915, the Italian Army and Navy at the time of the 1943 armistice were
using  equipment  that  was  qualitatively  little  different  from  the  material
available  in  June  1940.  However,  in  the  field  of  anti-aircraft  defenses,
particularly fighter aircraft, some significant improvements were made. The
introduction of the Fiat G.55, Macchi 205V, and Reggiane Re.2005 brought
aircraft into production that were finally the equivalent of Allied fighters,
but only 391 of all three models together were produced from the spring of
1942 onward as shortages of raw materials and labor undermined any effort
to modernize the force.94 The demands of air defense meant that the Italian
Air Force eventually privileged fighter production over the bomber sector. In
1940-41, there were two fighters produced for each bomber, but this ratio
was increased to nine fighters for every bomber in 1942, and 5.4 to one in
1943. The main efforts in fighter production and innovation thus emerged
only in 1942 when it was clear that the Italian Air Force had to concentrate
almost exclusively on defensive needs.95
In November 1942, after the first area bombardment of northern Italian
92. Alfieri to Ciano, 3 October 1941, DDI,  Vol.  7 (24 April‒11 December 1941), pp.
625-26.
93. Telegram from Teucci  to  Superaereo  and  the  Air  Ministry,  18  December  1941,
(Radiolocalizzatori), vol. I, MA, 1942, b. 23, cl. 2, s.cl. V, cartella 18, ACS.
94. Curami, "L'industria bellica prima dell'8 settembre," p. 667.
95. Fortunato Minniti, "Il problema degli armamenti nella preparazione militare italiana
dal 1935 al 1943," Storia contemporanea 9:1 (1978), pp. 38, 40.
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cities by the RAF, Air Force leaders as well as a number of industrialists
began to realize that both day and night attacks from "stratospheric" altitudes
were now to be expected all over Italy. It had become clear that the existing
anti-aircraft artillery was ineffective against high-altitude raids which were
flown beyond their range; the same was true of the existing fighter force.
Although new fighters were being produced, it proved impossible to build
them  in  high  enough  numbers  to  allow  their  employment  across  every
vulnerable zone. Instead, Air Force authorities fell back on older solutions.
The general inspector of aeronautical engineers instructed Italian firms to
"cover  ourselves  in  the  best  possible  way by  other  means,  such  as,  for
example, the acoustic detection service" to make sure the alarm was sounded
in time. In an illustration that the employment of radar was still negligible,
he argued that acoustic detection was likely to be easier at night when it was
not  possible  to  rely on  visual  sighting  systems.  He  also  advised  factory
owners  to  distribute  bags  of  sand,  considered  the  best  solution  for
extinguishing incendiary bombs in the first instance, as well as increasing
the number of  fire-fighting teams. With  little  understanding of  radar and
little  confidence  in  the  new  fighters,  which  were  indeed  never  mass-
produced, the Air Force still relied on traditional methods of detection at a
time when the RAF had already embarked on campaigns of area bombing by
night, to be joined in 1943 by heavy daylight raiding from the United States
Army Air Forces.96 The seriously damaged areas of the Fiat Mirafiori plant
in Turin after the raids in autumn 1942 measured more than 110,000 square
meters.  The  bombing  of  Fiat,  which  had  previously  been  thought
sufficiently defended by both Italian and German anti-aircraft guns, became
symbolic of the impending disaster. Almost half of Turin's inhabitants began
to  move  to  the  countryside.  By  January  1943,  as  a  result  of  the  raids,
diminished  supplies  from  Germany,  and  transport  deficiencies,  Fiat  was
producing at just above 40% of its capacity. After having repeatedly warned
Mussolini  about  the  disastrous  state  of  the  war  industry,  Cavallero  was
replaced as Chief of the Supreme Command by Vittorio Ambrosio.97
Another reason for the delays in war production was a lack of manpower.
Curami calculated that, in April 1942, across all Italian regions, there were
only 10,214 workers available, of whom 1,157 were skilled, 2,087 qualified,
6,255 were apprentices and only 715 were ordinary manual workers. Such
numbers could not remotely meet the needs of the aviation industries, which
had  advanced  an  astonishing  request  for  between  52,000  and  67,000
additional  workers.98 In  March  1942,  the  War  Ministry endorsed  an  Air
Ministry request for the following personnel as a matter of urgency to help
96. "Suggerimenti  e  norme  in  materia  di  organizzazione  contraerea  e  di  difesa
contraerea," General Inspector of Aeronautical Engineers Cristoforo Ferrari to a number
of firms (among which Alfa Romeo), 10 November 1942, MA, 1942, b. 46, cl. 3, s.cl. V,
cartella 20, ACS.
97. Castronovo, Fiat 1899–1999, pp. 599, 605.
98. Curami, "L'industria bellica prima dell'8 settembre," p. 672.
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organize the radar services and the air defense of Italian cities: twenty-six
junior  officers  of  good  breeding  and  well-informed  on  electrotechnical
matters;  thirty  non-commissioned  officers  with  similar  characteristics,
including  at  least  a  middle  school  diploma,  preferably  in  an  industrial
discipline;  and  2,500  students  from  the  last  year  of  high  school,  again
preferably  from  industrial  schools.99 However,  the  Supreme  Command
reported that the Army and the Navy could not spare any personnel for the
Air Force and, therefore, the only option was to send an unspecified number
of students.100
On 29 January 1943, Mussolini and the military leadership met at the
Palazzo Venezia to discuss how to strengthen the power of the armed forces.
Cavallero expressed alarm that the number of soldiers required continued to
increase. Of the eight to nine million men eligible for the armed forces, one
million had obtained exemption for  one reason or  another.  This  was not
sustainable,  he  emphasized,  "as  we  are  at  war  against  the  three  greatest
industrial powers in the world." Among other problems, Mussolini discussed
air defense and, in particular, the situation facing the fighter arm: there were
only 168 Macchi C.202 and 234 Macchi C.200 aircraft available, and, by
then, both of these planes were outdated, as were the Fiat CR.42 biplanes.
Even when new aircraft models of superior performance were developed,
particularly  the  Macchi  205V,  Fiat  G.55,  and  Reggiane  Re.2005  with
advanced armament, industry was unable to mass produce them because of a
shortage of appropriate aero-engines. The dictator ignored proposals by the
heads of the three forces, such as the need to militarize industrial workers,
because  he  lacked  the  courage  to  increase  workers'  hours.101 Mussolini's
attitude  was  not  unjustified.  Unrest  had  already begun  to  spread  in  the
factories  in  January,  foreshadowing  the  mass  strikes  of  March  1943.
Between November 1942 and February 1943, firms that performed contract
work for Fiat were either destroyed beyond repair or forced to move out of
Turin.  The  RAF  attacks  of  21  November  and  8-9  December  on  Turin
destroyed the assembly lines for the CR.42 and the MC.205 of Aeritalia,
with serious repercussions on their future production.102 The overall damage
from bombing by 31 December amounted to 250 million lire, but the Fiat
management was less worried about the cost of bombing than about low
morale in their workforce.103
99. "Personale specializzato per il funzionamento dei radiolocalizzatori," War Ministry,
Cabinet,  to  the  Direction  of Officers  Personnel  and  the  General  Army Direction,  27
March 1942, (Radiolocalizzatori),  vol.  II,  MA, 1942, b. 23, cl. 2, s.cl. V, cartella 18,
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100. "Personale  specializzato  per  il  funzionamento  dei  radiolocalizzatori,"  Supreme
Commander  to  War  Ministry  and  to  the  Air  Ministry,  19  March  1942,
(Radiolocalizzatori), vol. II, MA, 1942, b. 23, cl. 2, s.cl. V, cartella 18, ACS.
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Allied  bombers  continued  to  find  Italian  defenses  relatively  easy  to
overcome until the fall of the regime. A report on air activity in December
1942 revealed that, during daytime raids over Naples by American bombers,
alarms had sounded at  the wrong time and fighters  had arrived too late.
Subsequent reports for January and May 1943 showed that there was little
aviation  fuel  available,  that  there  were  too  few  fighters,  and  that  those
available generally arrived too late because there was no radar for advanced
warning.104 A concluding remark by the operations office of the Italian Air
Force suggested that the situation was doomed by March 1943: "The means
that  Italy  can  devote  to  the  defense  are  and  will  continue  to  be  both
numerically and technically deficient with regards to the offensive capacity
of the enemy."105
Aware of the inexorable superiority of enemy air power, Mussolini had
personally asked Hitler for help after the heavy raids of autumn 1942. He
denied that these had had any effect on the population's morale, but admitted
that they were dangerous in terms of the material damage caused to Italian
industry.  Confessing  that  the  relocation  of  industry  planned  before  the
beginning of the war had not made any progress, he reminded the  Führer
that most Italian factories were concentrated in the same areas and that it
was easy for the enemy to reach them. Whatever the season, days and nights
were  generally  clear  of  cloud  cover,  making  bombing  operations  much
easier than in German air space. Mussolini begged for a renewed supply of
air defenses, especially anti-aircraft batteries, to be returned to Germany as
soon  as  Italian  substitutes  had  been  produced—a  form  of  Axis  Lend-
Lease.106 Hitler's prompt response, besides reminding the Duce of Germany's
superior  experience  in  the  matter  of  air  defense,  suggested  that  he  was
willing to move artillery from German cities to Italian localities in need, only
requesting that the Italian Air Force train the crews to man them.107
Things might have proved easier if, by 1943, Italy had developed modern
night fighters. Their importance had been stressed since Italy's entrance into
the  war  when the  official  journal  of  the  Air  Force,  Rivista  Aeronautica,
sought to  persuade its readers that  a night fighter  force was no longer a
chimera, but was instead achievable. In October 1940, moreover, aviation
engineer Guidantonio Ferrari had written that it would soon be possible to
"establish—between  fighters  and  defense  positions  on  the  ground—a
connection that will allow the pilot during night flights to receive all the
History Workshop Journal 72 (2011), p. 185.
104. Reports on air activity for December 1942, January and May 1943, Box 2/E2485,
IWM.
105. Air Ministry Operations Office, Memorandum, 5 March 1943, Box 1/2470, IWM.
106. Mussolini  to Hitler, 19 November 1942,  DDI,  Vol.  9 (21 July 1942‒6 February
1943), pp. 321-22.
107. Hitler to Mussolini,  20 November 1942,  DDI,  Vol.  9 (21 July 1942‒6 February
1943), p. 329.
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useful information to ease the search and sight of enemy aircraft."108 Two
years later, even though Italian night fighters had not yet been produced, the
same journal continued to indulge in the same rhetoric.  General, pilot, and
air theorist Amedeo Mecozzi wrote in the summer of 1942 a fascinating but
mendacious account of the Italian air war, according to which Italian fighters
were now combating the bombers both by day and by night "at both low and
stratospheric altitudes"; by dominating the situation in the air, he continued,
they were able to dominate the related battles both on the ground and at
sea.109 In fact, throughout the duration of the conflict, Italy could only adapt
night fighters from planes that had been created for use during the day.110
Here, too, Italy had to rely on German initiatives. A new Axis agreement in
January  1943  established  the  positioning  of  German  night  fighters  in
Tunisia, Sicily, and Calabria; in June and July, the agreement extended all
along the Adriatic coast; and, in August, after the fall of Mussolini, night
fighters were stationed near industrial areas in the north at Venice, Turin,
Milan, and Genoa.111
This  was  not  the  only  problem to  arise.  It  proved  difficult  to  find  a
suitable  radio  wavelength  for  communication  between  converted  Italian
night fighters, ground stations, and the fixed defenses.112 New criteria for
collaboration between fighters and artillery needed to be established as a
matter of urgency since, by March 1943, it had become clear that at times
German planes shot Italian fighters down by mistake.113 Two months later,
the Air Ministry sent a note to Mussolini about the need to reorganize night
defenses, stating that it was necessary in key localities to link local night
fighter  commanders  with  air  defense  command  (Comando Tattico
Coordinatore)  to  ensure  closer  collaboration.  The  system  was  already
working in  Milan,  but  had yet  to  be introduced in Turin,  Rome, Genoa,
Naples,  and  Taranto.114 The  German  point  of  view was  that  the  DiCaT
command was not following the correct procedure. In March 1943, the 5th
Flak Division reported that the DiCaT at Milan and Turin instructed Italian
units that at night or in bad weather they should only open fire when they
were certain that enemy aircraft were over the objective; as the bombs began
to drop at the latest. The Germans considered such delays to be inopportune;
108. Guidantonio Ferrari, "Caccia notturna," Rivista Aeronautica 16:10 (October 1940),
p. 57.
109. Amedeo  Mecozzi,  "Sintesi  di  questa  guerra,"  Rivista  Aeronautica 18:8  (August
1942), p. 41.
110. Arena, La Regia Aeronautica, 1939–1943, Vol. 1, p. 89.
111. "Caccia notturna – Zone di sbarramento," Air Chiefs of Staff to Regia Aeronautica,
Anti-Aircraft Defense, Box 3/E2489, IWM.
112. "Armamenti  aerei,"  Superaereo  to  Air  Chiefs  of  Staff,  1  December  1942,  Box
3/E2489, IWM.
113. "Collaborazione fra caccia notturna e artiglieria c.a.," Supreme Commander, Army
Operations Office, 15 March 1943, to all services and Air Chiefs of Staff, Box 3/E2489,
IWM.
114. "Appunto per il Duce," Air Ministry, May 1943, Box 3/E2489, IWM.
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in Milan, Turin, Genoa, and Naples, German units were present with their
own  radar,  which  allowed  them  to  fight  enemy  aircraft  even  in  poor
visibility.115 This  explained  why German  anti-aircraft  fire  had  sometimes
shot down Italian fighters which, since they intervened at the wrong time,
were flying at their own risk.116 The Luftwaffe decided to deal with the issue
in April 1943, organizing a meeting in Rome on the collaboration between
day and night fighters and anti-aircraft artillery.  Superaereo, in agreement
with  the  Supreme  Command  and  the  DiCaT,  was  asked  to  send  a
representative.117 It  is  evident  from these  documents  that  everything  was
decided by the Luftwaffe and that the Italian air defense organizations were
simply instructed on how to behave.
Eventually, it was established that the artillery should stop firing once it
had been recognized that fighters had taken off to counter enemy planes. At
night, however, the artillery had priority, and fighters had to stay out of the
area; they had to be ready to intervene by attacking enemy aircraft either
before they entered the area covered by artillery, or after. A total or partial
suspension of fire could only occur when there was a direct link between the
tactical  command  of  night  fighters  and  the  local  command  of  the  air
defenses, and when the commander of the anti-aircraft artillery imposed a
ceasefire after receiving information on night fighters from the designated
officer. The local artillery commanders had to contact the fighter commands
responsible for their own area and inform them about the borders of the area
defended by anti-aircraft artillery. A direct telephone link was thus necessary
between artillery and fighters.118 The lack of coordination between fighters
and defense activity on the ground was in fact never resolved, even though
Francesco  Pricolo  had  insisted  as  early as  February 1940  on  its  critical
necessity when he wrote in Rivista Aeronautica that "the air force operates
in the sky but lives on the ground …. That is to say that the air force does
not act, in fact it does not exist, without [ground] services that provide the
chance of quick … enactment of its efficiency."119
The lack of coordination between the different areas of the air defense
system was also due to the absence of a unitary command structure and a
115. "Difesa c.a. in tempo di cattiva visibilità," German Office for the Training of anti-
aircraft artillery, attached to the Italian Armed Forces, to the Army Chiefs of Staff, Anti-
Aircraft Defense Office, 15 March 1943, Box 1/2476, IWM.
116. Chief of Staff to General Presso, 20 February 1943, Box 1/2470, IWM.
117. General Command of the Luftwaffe to the Italian Supreme Command, to Chiefs of
Staff for the Territorial Defense, to the Air Chiefs of Staff and to Superaereo, 7 April
1943, Box 1/2470, IWM.
118. "Collaborazione fra l'artiglieria c.a. e la caccia," Appendix,  General Command of
the Luftwaffe to  the Italian  Supreme Command, to Chiefs of Staff for the Territorial
Defense, to the Air Chiefs of Staff and to Superaereo, 7 April 1943, Box 1/2470, IWM.
119. Francesco  Pricolo,  La  Regia  Aeronautica  nella  Seconda  Guerra  Mondiale,
novembre 1939–novembre 1941 (Milan: Longanesi, 1971), p. 190. See also Sebastiano
Licheri,  L'arma aerea italiana, 10 giugno 1940–8 maggio 1945 (Milan: Mursia, 2000;
first ed. 1976), p. 229.
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single overall commander for the air defense effort of the three armed forces.
As Richard Overy has observed, fighters were supposed to defend during the
day  (even  at  the  time  when  most  raids  were  at  night)  and  anti-aircraft
artillery at night, but they were not coordinated at the local level under the
same command,  since fighters  were a  branch  of  the Air  Force and  anti-
aircraft  artillery  a  branch  of  the  Army.120 The  question  was  still  being
debated in the spring of 1943, when the Supreme Command wrote to the
Army,  Navy, and Air  Force staffs  that  "the issue of  unitary command is
fundamental, and must be resolved without compromises. With the current
organisation it is difficult sometimes to achieve timely coordination of all the
means of defense."121 The Naval staff agreed that a better coordination was
necessary but  that  this  could only be achieved gradually,  and not at  that
particular moment, in order to avoid shocks to the fragile air observation
system.122 The Air Force staff, on the other hand, agreed to support a system
of unitary command only as long as it was entrusted to an air officer.123 A
centralized direction was only agreed to in 1943 with the constitution of the
National  Corps  of  Air  Sighting  and  Signaling  (Corpo  Nazionale  di
Avvistamento e Segnalazione Aerea, CNASA), which was entrusted with the
task  of  launching  the  much-needed  unification  process—but  at  that  late
point, Italy had already signed the armistice.124
Besides these specific Italian problems, German help continued to be too
limited  to  have  any  significant  effect.  In  March  1943,  Foreign  Office
Undersecretary  Giuseppe  Bastianini  wrote  to  Alfieri  to  inform  him  that
almost all of Italy's requests for military materials had been ignored. This
was  particularly unfair,  he  believed,  considering  the  situation  within  the
enemy coalition, in which material was constantly exchanged between the
United  States,  the  British  Empire,  and  the  Soviet  Union.  Germany's
parsimoniousness towards Italy, despite the fact that they shared a common
interest,  and despite the fact that Germany well understood Italian needs,
had,  he  concluded,  produced  serious  morale  and  material  damage.125
Superaereo had  recently  raised  the  problem  in  terms  of  air  defenses,
particularly because of Italy's desperate need for night fighters. The few that
had been sent from Germany, Dornier Do.217s, were deemed to be old and
inefficient; while rejecting these criticisms, the Fliegerkorps responded that,
in any case, they had no better aircraft to offer.126 By the first half of 1943,
120. Overy, The Bombing War, p. 514.
121. "Difesa  contro-aerea,"  Supreme  Command  to  Superesercito,  Superaereo  and
Supermarina, 13 March 1943, Box 1/2470, IWM.
122. "Difesa  contraerea,"  Navy  Chiefs  of  Staff  to  the  Supreme  Command,  to
Superesercito and Superaereo, 15 April 1943, Box 1/2470, IWM.
123. Air Chiefs of Staff, Aerial Defense, to the Supreme Command, 11 April 1943, Box
1/2470, IWM.
124. Arena, La Regia Aeronautica, 1939–1943, Vol. 1, p. 73.
125. Bastianini to Alfieri, 17 March 1943, DDI, Vol. 10 (7 February‒8 September 1943),
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Germany had indeed began to slow down the promised level of support, not
only because anti-aircraft defenses were now much needed in Germany and
on the Eastern Front, but also because Italy's conditions were so hopeless
that  there  seemed  to  be  no  way of  connecting  German  and  Italian  anti-
aircraft  artillery  because  of  the  lack  of  an  effective  military  telephone
service. Many German defenses were moved back to Berlin, leaving Italian
cities and strategic targets dangerously exposed.127
By June 1943, Alfieri was writing to Bastianini in despair: "Why … do
the Germans not resolve to send Italy the indispensable means—especially
aircraft—to  provide  an  effective  and  timely  contribution?"  One  possible
reason, he had ascertained, was that they no longer had the capacity to do so.
While Goebbels spoke of the will for unlimited resistance in Europe, he did
not seem to consider the profound differences between the actual situation
and  material  capabilities  of  the  two Axis  countries.128 On  13  July 1943,
confronted with the invasion of Sicily, Hitler wrote to Mussolini that he had
decided  to  send  more  bombers,  fighters,  and  anti-aircraft  artillery to  the
island. However, he emphasized that in return, the Italians had to create a
sufficient  ground  organization  in  Calabria.  He  was  aware  that  Italian
resistance to such organization—caused both by shortages of personnel and
a lack of assistance from local authorities—had been a problem throughout
the war,  and that  it  had prejudiced the employment and consolidation of
German  aviation  in  Italy.  Hitler  complained  to  Mussolini  that  deficient
Italian  defenses  and  coordination  had  meant  that  in  recent  weeks  enemy
bombers  had  destroyed  more  than  320  German  fighters  in  Sicily  and
southern  Italy.  He  concluded  by  imploring  the  Duce to  eliminate  the
practical  obstacles  and—rather  humiliatingly  for  the  Italian  dictator—to
ensure that "your forces in Sicily also fight until the very end for the defense
of the island, as the latter can only be held through the common combat of
our  troops."129 Although  the  activity  to  counter  enemy  occupation  of
Pantelleria  and  Lampedusa  was  almost  exclusively  conducted  by  the
Luftwaffe (the Regia Aeronautica's actions were limited to only two attacks
by eight  or  nine  MC.200s  on  8  and  11  June),130 a  resentful  Alfieri  told
Bastianini that Germany would not commit itself fully against the Anglo-
American invasion of Italy because its main effort was against Russia. He
concluded that Germany was no longer strong enough to fight fully in Italy
but  instead  sought  to  encourage  Italy's heroic  resistance  while  providing
only limited means.  Since aid arrived only in small amounts and usually too
"Relazione stato efficienza velivoli Do. 217," Air Ministry to Air Attaché to the Italian
Embassy, Berlin, 29 January 1943, MA, 1943, b. 156, ACS.
127. Labanca, "L'esercito e la contraerea," p. 140.
128. Alfieri to Bastianini, 7 June 1943, DDI, Vol. 10 (7 February‒8 September 1943),
pp. 523-24.
129. Hitler to Mussolini, 13 July 1943, DDI, Vol. 10 (7 February‒8 September 1943),
pp. 652-54.
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late,  it  proved  insufficient  to  alter  the  course  of  events  in  what  was  a
continuously deteriorating situation.131
Conclusion
As General Rino Fougier, Air Force Chief of Staff from November 1941,
admitted  in  June  1943,  night  fighters  in  Italy  were  "still  at  a  stage  of
formation; the absence of visibility at night was only compensated for by a
few  electronic  instruments  of  limited  capacity."132 The  first  competitive
Italian fighters—the MC.205, Re.2005, and Fiat G.55—became available in
small quantities only in the summer of 1943, just before the final collapse.133
Between January 1940 and May 1943, fighters had been produced in higher
numbers than any other type of aircraft, demonstrating that defense was the
priority. Altogether, 10,345 planes had been produced, of which 4,310 were
fighters. As to fighters themselves, Lucio Ceva calculated that 1,155 were
produced in 1940; 1,139 in 1941; 1,488 in 1942; and 528 in 1943. 134 In
qualitative terms, the only production of any value was of fighters. Produced
in 1941, the Macchi C.202 was useful in terms of speed (600 km per hour)
and  maneuverability,  although  weakly armed  (the  usual  pair  of  12.7mm
machine  guns);  the  Re.2001  was  slower  (545 km per  hour),  but  slightly
better  armed (with  two 12.7mm and two 7.7mm machine  guns).  All  the
series  5  fighters—the  Macchi  205V,  Fiat  G.55,  and  Re.2005—were
excellent in terms of speed (650 km per hour on average) and well armed
with 20mm cannon as well  as two 12.7mm machine guns,  each of  them
capable of matching Allied machines. However, only the Macchi 205V saw
limited employment in the first months of 1943, while the other two did not
have time to be used before Italy surrendered.  Moreover,  they were still
interceptors, with a flight capability of about one hour, while the issue of a
heavier fighter with greater endurance and firepower, capable of carrying an
airborne  radar  and  operator,  remained  unresolved.135 The  most  striking
aspect, however, was the enormous gap between Italy's production and that
of its enemies. In 1943, for each Italian aircraft, the Allies produced forty-
five—eleven British, twenty-eight American, and six Russian. German and
Japanese production,  though much inferior  to  that  of  the Allies,  was ten
times higher than the Italian. Moreover, German deliveries, always less than
promised,  were  calculated  to  be  sufficient  to  discourage  an  independent
Italian role.136 As MacGregor Knox has shown, between 1940 and 1943, the
Italian  air  forces  received  10,389  aircraft,  while  German  and  American
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production  in  the  same  period  was,  respectively,  62,239  and  157,000
aircraft.  More  than  any other  factor,  the  destiny of  Italy's  war  was  thus
decided by those figures.137 Following a meeting with Fougier in September
1942, Ciano had gathered that "between us and Germany we cannot produce
more  than  one  fifth  or  one  sixth  of  what  the  Allies  are  producing.  The
recruitment of pilots is also scarse and second-rate. By the summer of 1943
air supremacy will be solidly in Allied hands."138
The story of Italian air defenses, whether fighter aircraft, artillery, radar,
or civil defense, reflected many of the failures of the Fascist regime itself.
Mussolini's  strategy  forced  Italy  to  assume  military  responsibilities  and
economic commitments which it could not hope to meet in a situation where
the world's trade routes were dominated by the enemy, and the only major
ally, Germany, had too many commitments of its own. Moreover, industrial
self-interest  and  inter-service  rivalry  combined  to  inhibit  even  more  the
efforts of the regime to protect its population, maintain adequate armaments
output, and compete in technical terms with the Allies. The contrast between
Italian air defenses and the sophisticated German system, the most elaborate
and effective air defense system in the world by 1943, represented in stark
terms  the  contrast  between  the  two  wartime  Allies.  The  cost  of  these
deficiencies was ultimately borne by the Italian civilian population who, in
the end, suffered more than 60,000 deaths from bombing and endured years
of terror and hardship, for a war with which a great many of them had never
identified.
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